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Abstract: In 1940, Walt Disney was faced with crafting a message of 
corporate accountability under duress. His company, the product of 
his creative genius, had been forced to submit to public account-
ability. It had a pressing need to raise preferred equity finance for a 
major expansion during a period of market uncertainty, war, and 
reported losses. This paper conducts a "close reading" of the "Letter 
to Stockholders" in Walt Disney Productions' 1940 annual report, 
the first such letter signed by Walt Disney. The letter's rhetorical fea-
tures, including metaphor and ideology, are examined in the con-
text of the times. What is revealed is an accountability document 
skillfully crafted with the exigencies faced by Disney's company 
firmly in mind. The letter offers suggestive insight to the world as 
Disney made sense of it. The paper contributes to understanding 
the use of rhetoric by top management in activities related to 
aspects of financial accountability and reporting. It also helps to 
understand better a significant public persona of the 20th century, 
Walt Disney. 
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
Analysis of annual reports, including letters by CEOs to stock-
holders, has a long history in management and accounting litera-
tures. Discourse by CEOs is important not only because of the 
power that corporate leaders wield in their own organizations, 
but also because of their political and cultural influence generally. 
Since such discourse may be viewed as a form of sense making 
[Weick, 1995], its study also has value because the CEO may be 
talking or writing at least partly to himself or herself, and in so 
doing creating, justifying, and reacting to the world thus fash-
ioned. We think, talk, and write to help us learn and understand 
what we then know [Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993; 
Weick, 1995]. CEOs are no different. 
The many papers which have examined CEOs' letters to share-
holders included in corporate annual reports have had a focus 
other than exploring the metaphors and ideologies at play within 
such discourse (e.g.; Bettman and Weitz [1983]; Salancik and 
Meindl [1984]; Hager and Scheiber [1990]; Jones and Shoemaker 
[1994]; Abrahamson and Amir [1996]; Thomas [1997]; Courtis 
[1998]; Hyland [1998]; Devinney and Kabanoff [1999]). This 
paper follows a path largely untrodden in previous studies of 
stockholders' letters in accounting annual reports. It explores, by 
means of a "close reading," meaning in the narrative of the stock-
holders' letter of the first public annual report of the global com-
pany which still bears Walt Disney's name. Such accountability 
narrative merits close reading since it is part of the "battery of 
belief-forming institutions" [Tinker, 1985, p. 82] top management 
uses to define the language by means of which its self-accounts are 
to be written. Our close reading is performed with an interest not 
only in "examin[ing] the way discourses are constructed in order 
to achieve certain effects" [Eagleton, 1983, p. 205], but also to help 
reveal more about the author. 
The close reading we conduct is similar to Slagell's [1991, p. 
155] "close textual analysis" of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugu-
ral address during the American Civil War, in which she "consid-
ers the speech in relation to its historical setting" (pp. 155-156). Of 
course, in contrast to an American president's inaugural address, 
CEOs' annual letters to stockholders are mundane, common dis-
courses of seemingly minor importance. It is perhaps because of 
their commonness and institutionalized, periodic, calendric role 
in the functioning of our socioeconomy that such common docu-
ments deserve scrutiny. Letters to stockholders, written by CEOs 
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and published in corporate annual reports, are too important a 
part of the ideological paraphernalia of our society to be ignored 
or brushed aside as mere rhetoric. 
The chosen text is the letter to stockholders included in the 
annual report of Walt Disney Productions, issued in respect of the 
financial year ended September 28, 1940, and signed by Walt 
Disney. Disney's company had been compelled to seek outside 
capital to finance the expansion of its studio. Our analysis uncov-
ers aspects of the public persona of the then very prominent Walt 
Disney, a person reputedly "the most significant figure in graphic 
arts since Leonardo" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131, citing 
British cartoonist David Low]. He, or his alter ego, is revealed, 
inter alia, as a skillful financial and business rhetorician whose dis-
course reveals ways of thinking that accord with the ideology of 
the market [Carrier, 1997]. Such microanalysis of an accountabili-
ty text prepared by top management is consistent with entreaties 
for accounting-related narratives in annual reports to be investi-
gated "to better understand the motives and attitudes of manage-
ment and the communication process" [Jones and Shoemaker, 
1994, p. 174], and, more generally, with polemics in recent 
accounting literature encouraging "greater use of narratives in 
accounting and management research" [Llewellyn, 1999, p. 233]. 
The particular Disney stockholders' letter we analyze deserves 
special study for three additional reasons: 
•First, it is the initial stockholders' letter of the Disney 
Company, a corporation that today has global importance in the 
entertainment and communications industries. 
•Second, the letter was a public and permanent docu-
ment signed and most likely substantially crafted by Walt Disney 
(perhaps with contributions from his brother Roy).1 Thus, it has 
potential to provide insight to Disney's public persona at the time 
and seems likely to add to historical understanding of this 
acknowledgedly charismatic, yet complex business and cultural 
leader [Boje, 1995; Bryman, 1995]. We cannot say with certainty 
(nor can anyone we expect) that Walt Disney physically drafted 
1Attributing authorship unequivocally to Walt Disney solely or substantially is 
difficult if not impossible. While acknowledging this lack of strong, unequivocal 
proof of authorship, we take some solace that it is the "metaphoric Walt," as men-
tioned in the next footnote, that may be of sustaining importance. As Schickel 
11968/1997, p. 44] wrote: "In the last analysis, Walt Disney's greatest creation was 
Walt Disney." There is no doubt that the "metaphoric Walt" signed and is account-
able for the letter. 
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the 1940 stockholders' letter. However, in view of his reputation 
for keeping "a sharp eye on financial arrangements" [Capodagli 
and Jackson, 1998, p. 185], his multi-skilling philosophy, his acute 
awareness of the "bottom line," and his obsession with careful 
attention to small detail [Capodagli and Jackson, 1998, pp. 7, 181-
185], it seems likely that he was strongly implicated. Watts [1997, 
p. 260], a Walt Disney biographer, referred to "Walt's comments" 
in his brief reference to the company's annual reports of the 
1940s. In addition, Schickel's [1968/97, p. 256] detailed descrip-
tions supporting Walt Disney's dominant role and "father figure" 
persona in regard to his company, provided strong, albeit circum-
stantial, evidence that Disney had at least some significant hand in 
the letter's crafting. 
• Third, since stockholders' letters in recent Disney annu-
al reports make explicit, favorable reference to "Walt" [Amernic, 
1998], a "metaphoric Walt" may influence current-day Disney 
CEOs.2 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides con-
text for the letter and its analysis. The third section examines 
rhetorical qualities of the letter, except for metaphor, which is ana-
lyzed in section four. A final section contains concluding com-
ments. 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE DISNEY STOCKHOLDERS' LETTER 
The Stock Issue—Features, Reasons, Consequences: In 1940, Walt 
Disney Productions, as the company was then known, was a rela-
tively small film production studio in terms of financial and tangi-
ble assets, but not in terms of reputation, expectations, and inno-
vation. It had just gone public by issuing 155,000 shares of $25 par 
value, 6% cumulative, convertible preferred stock (see Exhibit 1). 
As a consequence, the Disney brothers ' company became publicly 
accountable. Its first annual report, for the fiscal year ended 
September 28, 1940, was issued in December 1940. That report is 
the focus of this paper. Of particular interest is the letter to stock-
holders, a text not only proffered to the public domain but also 
personally associated with the company's chief executive. The let-
ter to stockholders was signed by Walt Disney and was included as 
the first main component of the report. 
2A reviewer has drawn attention to the prospect that a "metaphoric Walt" 
helps provide flexibility in justifying present business practices of the Disney cor-
poration. He could be used in much the same way as Sam Walton might be used as 
an ongoing mythic figure at Wal-Mart Inc. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Selected Financial and Other Information About 
Walt Disney Productions in 1940 
Reported net income or loss for fiscal year ended 
September 28. 1940* 
Total assets reported on balance sheet as of 
September 28. 1940* 
Stockholders equity reported on balance sheet as of 
September 28. 1940*? 
Number of employees * 
Number of feature animated films released in fiscal 
1940* 
Total reported production costs for feature animated 
films released in 1940* 
Number of shorts ("cartoons'") released in fiscal 
1940* 
Average production costs for a cartoon released in 
1940# 
A loss of $1,259,798 
$8,562,137, of which $4,926,557 represented costs 
associated with feature films and short subjects (in 
other words, "soft" assets) 
$5,787,646 





*from 1940 annual report. 
#derived from information in 1940 annual report 
Disney was prompted to raise capital from the public, accord-
ing to the New York Times [February 22, 1940, p. 35, col. 7], by an 
immediate need to provide permanent capital for the company's 
huge expansion program then nearing completion—a $3 million, 
51-acre studio complex in Burbank, California. In 1940, Time mag-
azine [March 25, 1940, p. 77] put it thus: 
Last week, with its second full-length feature, 
Pinocchio, ready for a nation-wide Easter week 
opening, Walt Disney productions applied to the 
SEC for permission to sell 155,000 shares of $25 
par, 6% cumulative convertible preferred stock. 
Purpose of the $3,875,000 offering: to pay off 
bank loans incurred in building the company's 
new studio at Burbank, Calif., and to provide work-
ing capital for four more features now in produc-
tion: Bambi, Wind in the Willows, Peter Pan, 
Fantasia. 
Disney had a long history of reinvesting profits from his ani-
mated films and other revenue sources. He did so to meet ever-ris-
ing production costs and to help ensure even better films in the 
future [Hollister, 1940]. As early as 1934, Fortune magazine [1934, 
p. 91] described Disney as reinvesting profits "for the sole pur-
pose of making his films more beautiful, more elaborate, more 
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nearly perfect." But, by early 1940, earnings had taken an unex-
pected battering for three principal reasons: the lukewarm box 
office response to Pinocchio, Disney's difficulties in containing 
costs, and the effects of the European war. 
Bryman [1995, pp. 9-10] summarized the position confronting 
Disney: 
Largely as a result of Snow Whites success 
[released on December 21, 1937], Walt realized 
that feature film production had to become the 
Studio's main focus, and soon afterwards work 
began on Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi. In order 
to accomplish this level of production effort...the 
[Disney] brothers decided to build a new studio. 
In the summer of 1938, they placed a deposit for a 
new purpose-built studio in Burbank. In effect, 
the new studio building would consume the bulk 
of the profits from Snow White. The move was 
completed in May 1940, by which time the studio 
had about 1,100 employees. The Studio's financial 
position began to deteriorate [in 1939]. Both 
Fantasia and Pinocchio performed poorly at the 
box office and produced sizeable losses, the for-
mer especially so, since they had proved very cost-
ly to produce. Also, Disney's European market had 
all but dried up as a result of the war...the Studio 
was heavily in debt and was forced to issue [pre-
ferred stock] shares to the public in April 1940, a 
move to which the brothers had always been 
opposed (emphasis added). 
The reasons for the preferred stock issue merit some elabora-
tion. While the audiences responded very positively to Snow 
White ("The $1,500,000 borrowed to make Snow White was 
repaid within three months..." [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]), there was 
always the risk that after the initial successes, the movie-going 
public would consider such films just a fad and would quickly lose 
interest. Disney's next animated feature, Pinocchio, released in 
1940, fared poorly. It was a challenge to create and produce full-
length, animated films involving cartoon characters that audi-
ences would pay to see. The market for feature films of this type 
was new and unproven. 
Additionally, Disney was struggling to maintain profitability in 
an environment characterized by a rapidly changing technology 
in animation and movie making. He was confronted by market 
uncertainty and considerable production risks posed by the chal-
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lenges of new technology (i.e., coping with the special sound 
equipment requirements for Fantasia). It was a challenge as well 
to maintain control over costs while at the same time striving for 
better quality ("The average pay is higher than the average in any 
other Hollywood studio" [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]). In a sense, his 
problem was similar to that now confronting computer hardware 
and software companies. 
The European war3 also had a major impact on the studio by 
limiting the company's ability to release pictures in any of the 
countries at war. This constrained the market for basic cartoon 
shorts and, even more importantly for new features. Given the 
technological and cost-control risks associated with new, full-
length, animated films, losing the potential to spread some of the 
market-acceptance risk was a serious blow — audiences in foreign 
markets might have resulted in a future stream of revenues even if 
the domestic market eventually regarded these films as mere fads. 
Furthermore, currency regulations, as well as fluctuations in for-
eign exchange rates, reduced the company's revenues from pic-
tures already released in foreign countries. And even domestic cin-
ema goers might be less inclined to spend their disposable income 
on going to the theater, given the prospect of U.S. involvement in 
the war. 
So, at the time Walt Disney signed the 1940 letter to stock-
holders, Walt Disney Productions was in a precarious position. It 
had to learn to master new technology. It had a product with a 
potentially vast market, but that market was largely unproven in 
the longer term. The European war was beginning to have an 
impact and seemed destined to create further havoc with film dis-
tribution and markets, both worldwide and domestically. The inti-
mate control exercised by Disney over every facet of the business4 
was being strained by rapid expansion and the challenges men-
tioned above, as well as by the need to raise funds through a pub-
lic stock offering. Schickel [1968/1997, pp. 49, 247] described 
Disney's attitude within the context of this difficult time in the fol-
lowing way: 
3 Although it had provided significant support to Britain and its allies, the U.S. 
did not enter World War II until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
December 7, 1941. 
4According to Hollister [1940, p. 700]: "Walt is the spark plug of production. 
No story starts toward a picture until Walt has bought or invented it, shaped it, 
tried it out, and given it a push...Throughout the production pattern of every pic-
ture Walt threads in and out like a guiding outline...Walt knifes into the most 
minute step of the most microscopic element..." 
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...The precariousness of the family's livelihood 
undoubtedly shaped his own desire not merely to 
succeed but to do so in a particular way—namely, 
to avoid surrendering any part of his autonomy to 
outsiders and to hold his company's stock and its 
decision-making power as closely as he could. 
...Indeed, in 1938 he had every reason to believe 
that he could afford a money-losing experiment 
[that is, Fantasia]. But with Pinocchio unable to 
perform as expected abroad and with the poten-
tially profitable but difficult Bambi put aside in 
order to devote full effort to Fantasia, he was sud-
denly in perilous straights. Far more than should 
have depended on Fantasia. 
And the situation worsened even as the film 
approached completion. Early in 1940 the banks 
shut down the Disney credit line entirely, and in 
order to raise operating capital he was forced in 
April, 1940, to offer stock to the public for the first 
time—a step he feared would mean dilution of his 
control over the enterprise...it was a psychological 
blow that was perhaps harder for him to take than 
it would have been for other men. 
To exacerbate matters, the company had incurred a signif-
icant loss in 1940 (see Exhibit 1). Thus, it was an opportune time 
for Walt Disney to display the charismatic leadership for which he 
became famous. The thesis of this article is that he did so partly 
through skillful rhetoric employed in the 1940 letter to stockhold-
ers. To contextualize further the circumstances leading to the 
stock issue and the environmental circumstances in which 
Disney's letter to stockholders was composed, it is important to 
develop a better understanding of the history of the Disney com-
pany and the persona of Walt Disney, subjects to which we now 
turn. 
Company History: In 1924, Walter Elias Disney, a 23-year-old car-
toonist, opened a small animation studio in a storefront in Los 
Angeles with his older brother Roy. The business was known as 
the "Disney Bros. Studio," but when it moved into new premises 
near downtown Los Angeles in 1926, it became the "Walt Disney 
Studio." Disney's early ventures endured hardships typical of 
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many business startups.5 Walt Disney went bankrupt before his 
move from Kansas City to Los Angeles and his subsequent initial 
success in the late 1920s. He is reported to have said: "When I was 
21, I went broke for the first time. I slept in chair cushions in my 
studio in Kansas City, and ate cold beans out of the can" [Boje, 
1995, p. 1024]. 
The company achieved its first major success when its ani-
mated cartoon, Steamboat Willie, featuring the new Mickey Mouse 
character, was shown at the Colony Theater in New York on 
November 18, 1928. Although the company's cartoons were very 
popular, by the early 1930s the Walt Disney Studio was struggling 
to survive since, among other problems, animation costs contin-
ued to rise. But its fortunes were soon to improve. Lucrative mer-
chandising agreements were negotiated, granting permission for 
images of Disney characters, such as Mickey Mouse, to be used on 
manufactured items.6 With the release of the company's first fea-
ture animated film, Snow White, merchandising agreements were 
at the forefront of what was called "a new dimension in fashion 
merchandising" [Bristol, 1938, p. 13].7 The introduction of color to 
improve cartoon quality led to an Academy Award and commercial 
success for the studio's first color cartoon, Flowers and Trees. 
Other innovations in animation, such as providing cartoon char-
acters with unique, focused personalities (as in The Three Little 
Pigs and for characters such as Pluto, Donald Duck, and Goofy) 
appealed to Depression-era audiences. 
5Problems included decreasing profit margins on their products (cartoons) as 
they endeavored to make technical improvements to satisfy their market, as well as 
hardball tactics by their financial backers (who lured away several of Disney's ani-
mators). The material for this and several following paragraphs draws upon 
Bryman [1995], unless otherwise noted. 
6The New Internationalist [1998], the Walt Disney Company 1997 Fact Book, 
and de Cordova [1994] are drawn upon to disclose that, "In 1930 the first interna-
tional licensing contract for the sale of Mickey Mouse merchandise was 
signed... [and that] ...the first Mickey Mouse watch was sold by Ingersoll Watch 
Company in June, 1933" [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 19]. 
7Disney's approach to licensing his animated characters for commercial 
exploitation was highly successful very quickly: "...in 1932 sales of Disney charac-
ter articles had totaled $300,000, in 1937 they were $35,000,000" [Bristol, 1938, p. 
15]. That success has become institutionalized; in modern times there is a well 
established and curiously seamless fusion of cinematic art with consumerism: 
"Every Disney animated film comes bundled with a complete marketing strategy 
for merchandise, interactive games and a line of children's books" [New 
Internationalist, 1998, p. 28]. 
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By 1934, the company employed 187 staff. Walt Disney decid-
ed to expand into the feature film business since "it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to combine the growing costs of animation... 
with the inherently limited returns that could accrue from shorts" 
[Bryman, 1995, p. 9]. The company's first feature-length anima-
tion movie, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, which opened on 
December 21, 1937, was a great success, at first critically and then 
commercially.8 The company began other animated features 
(Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi), while continuing to produce 
cartoon shorts. It soon outgrew its studio facilities. Plans for a 
new, custom-designed studio were hatched in the summer of 
1938, and the company, now with about 1,100 employees and 
called "Walt Disney Productions," moved into its new studio in 
May 1940. The decision to focus much of the company's efforts on 
very expensive but potentially very profitable feature animated 
films, as well as the related need for new production facilities, 
prompted the company to raise funds from the public through a 
preferred stock issue in April 1940. It subsequently released its 
first published annual report in December of that year. 
Disney Persona: By 1940, Walt Disney was acclaimed widely as an 
international success. Indeed, even by the early 1930s, Disney had 
reached a position of eminence that matched the greatest of 
Hollywood stars. His admirers included Italian conductor 
Toscanini and Russian film director Eisenstein, among a glittering 
array of adoring fans [Costantino, 1991, p. 12]. Disney's Mickey 
Mouse character became "a national figure, an international 
attraction, and finally a cultural totem" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, 
p. 130]. Critics from New York to Leningrad were said to "gravely 
laud him" [Fortune, 1934, p. 89].9 In 1934, his comedies were 
exhibited in 88 countries, and he was said to be "an international 
hero, better known than Roosevelt or Hitler, a part of the folklore 
of the world" (p. 89). Watts [1997, p. 124] described the cultural 
influence of Disney in the 1930s in the following way: 
8One wonders whether modern-day audiences would have been so receptive 
to a female hero who was "young, virginal, pretty, sweet-natured and obedient" and 
unfazed by domestic drudgery through absolute belief that "a handsome owning-
class chap [would], someday soon, come and save her" [Maio, 1998, p. 12]. 
9A11 references in this section are taken from Fortune [ 1934], unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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Universities...provided reinforcement for the 
notion of Disney animation as art. In 1933, the 
College Art Association helped arrange an exhibi-
tion of Disney drawings in New York. Five years 
later, Harvard, Yale, and the University of Southern 
California granted honorary degrees to Walt 
Disney... 
The lengthy and major profile of Disney and his film-making 
operations in Fortune magazine in 1934 portrayed him as a myth-
maker. His products were said to enthrall audiences throughout 
the world by bringing them to a "delicate balance between fanta-
sy and fact, poetry and comic reality." They were said to appeal to 
the simplest emotions and to give pleasure. They had "plasticity" — 
nothing in a Disney film was impossible (p. 88). The themes of his 
cartoons were such that "courage overcomes wickedness and fear; 
industry triumphs over dalliance; false ambition gives way to res-
ignation" (p. 88). In sum, they were short morality plays. They 
were the epitome also of what has become known as "disneyfica-
tion" — "sanitized, safe, entertaining and predictable" entertain-
ment [Ellwood, 1998, p. 8]. 
Disney has been described as a moody, deliberately "ordinary," 
informal man who, although having "rural gusto and naive fancy" 
(p. 90), nonetheless had an imagination renowned for its fantastic 
quality (p. 146). He was a stickler for high artistic standards; he 
made daring and innovative use of music, sound, and folk materi-
al; and he was reported to "mistrust the shoddiness and hypocrisy 
of the pseudo-artist" (p. 146). His personality was said to have 
been shaped by "a nostalgic yearning for romance or simple val-
ues" and to have been affected by a "frugal, authoritarian and 
moralistic" father [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8]. 
But as Boje [1995] has argued, Disney had a "darker side." The 
Dictionary of American Biography claimed that Disney became 
"self-satisfied, intractable, arrogant" and was "probably never the 
quite generous father of a gifted flock that he seemed on the sur-
face" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. "The discerning eye," it 
was said, could find in his programs "breaches of taste, philistine 
wisecracks, a milking of the nostalgic mood, slipshod cultural ref-
erences, a growing dependence on received folklore and other 
people's classics, and an increasingly slick technical achievement 
of rather tawdry effects" [Garrety and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. His 
character Mickey Mouse was said to have been flawed by a streak 
of sadism, and the film Fantasia was adjudged by some as a "pre-
11
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tentious hodgepodge." He was alleged to be "both paternalistic 
and domineering...he brooked no dissent, rewarding loyalists wi th 
favors and punishing dissidents" [New Internationalist, 1998, p . 
8]. 
RHETORICAL QUALITIES OF THE 1940 
LETTER TO STOCKHOLDERS 
The Writer: In 1940, Walt Disney was not just another ordinary 
corporate CEO writing a stockholders' letter for the first annual 
report of a relatively small, new public company. As we have 
shown above, he was a cultural sensation. He had been wri t ten 
about rather extensively in the 1930s in major national publica-
tions such as Fortune, New Yorker, American Magazine, 
Scribners, New York Times Magazine, Time, etc. [Bryman, 1995]. 
He was also someone who guarded with zeal his prerogatives to 
lead and to control the results of his genius [Hollister, 1940]. As 
Bryman [1995, p. 10] claimed, he was "forced" to issue shares 
because of the company's debt. How might a cultural icon, whose 
creative genius had long been publicly acknowledged, contem-
plate the writing of a stockholders' letter as part of a compelled 
accountability flowing from the apparently unwanted, but finan-
cially necessary, public offering? This question is important in a 
rhetorical sense since "the speaker's life, insofar as it is public, 
forms a long prelude to his speech" [Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1958, p. 320]. 
The Audience: Modern annual reports, including the stockhold-
ers' letter, often have many audiences with diverse and partly con-
flicting interests. These audiences include current and potential 
stockholders and debt holders, financial intermediaries, employ-
ees, unions, competitors and the public-at-large, among others. 
While it seems reasonable to surmise that Disney's 1940 letter was 
an important part of financial reporting intended for similar 
diverse constituencies, perhaps the first among equals was the 
new group of preferred stockholders. Disney was in a somewhat 
invidious position for he had just been provided a financial lifeline 
to sustain his company. He was confronted with the problem of 
crafting a document mainly intended for the company's new pre-
ferred stockholders. He needed to be alert to the potential they 
had to constrain his ownership and his pursuit of all things asso-
ciated with his icon status. He would need to acknowledge the var-
ious operating and market difficulties the company had faced and 
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the difficulties it might face in the future. Additionally, he would 
have to explain effectively how top management (that is, the 
Disney brothers) was firmly in control and leading the company 
towards future success. In clear and compelling terms, he would 
need to analyze the company's performance and prospects so as to 
encourage strong and unwavering adherence to Disney's leader-
ship of the newly public company. His letter would have to serve 
as a public vehicle for sense making [Weick 1995, p. 13] by pre-
ferred stockholders and others interested in the company, includ-
ing himself and his brother. 
Rhetorical Characteristics of the Initial Substantive Section: The 
1940 "Letter to Stockholders" is reproduced in Appendix 1. Its sec-
ond section, following immediately after the warm but respectful 
welcome, is headed "NEW STUDIO." It is reproduced below with 
each sentence labeled for reference: 
NEW STUDIO 
[Sentence 1] At the time of the sale of the 6% 
Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was 
construct ing and equipping its n e w studio. 
[Sentence 2] This studio was substantially com-
pleted and equipped and virtually all of the 
Company's product ion operations were trans-
ferred thereto by the end of May, 1940. [Sentence 
3] As a result of the increased facilities, the 
Company has been able to augment its production 
of completed footage by more than 100% and has 
succeeded in lowering the cost of production per 
foot substantially. [Sentence 4] Therefore, the 
Company will be able to carry out its new policy 
of releasing two or more feature subjects each 
year as well as a large number of short subjects. 
[Sentence 5] As a result of the reduction in costs, 
short subjects are now being produced at a figure 
which the management believes will result in prof-
itable releases even though sources of income in 
certain foreign countries now at war are no longer 
available. 
Sentence 1 links the preferred stock issue (that is, the resources 
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provided by the "Stockholders" to whom the entire letter is 
addressed) with the positive, forceful activities of "constructing 
and equipping." While the "ing" endings are a weak example of 
rhetorical use of repetition (homoioteleuton), the effect is made 
rhetorically stronger by culminating in the fulfillment of a major 
task ("completed," "transferred," "succeeded"). This is an extreme-
ly positive section of the letter, with good use of forceful action 
words and a strong sense of direction. Indeed, Sentence 4 begin-
ning "Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its new 
policy..." assures that promises will be kept and that the company 
has a logical, rational plan unfolding as it should. It establishes the 
following close, sequential linkage: 
New financial resources from preferred stock issue 
New, larger studio 
Increased capacity and efficiency 
Lower unit costs 
Increase in number of features released and short subjects 
Expected profits 
This piling-up of arguments in support of expected profits, 
rhetorically a sort of diallage, which Lanham [1991, p. 51] 
explained as "bringing several arguments to establish a single 
point," creates a sense of moving forward with an active, in-con-
trol management in charge.10 
10Within this piling-up of arguments are other rhetorical devices. First, repeti-
tion of the phrase "As a result o f at the start of sentence three and sentence five 
interlaces two references to cost reduction. Such phrasal repetition verges on 
anaphora, whereby the same words "are repeated at the beginning of successive 
clauses..." [Lanham, 1991, p. 11]. Second, the use of action-oriented, decisive words 
and phrases such as "At the time of the sale;" "was constructing," "was substantial-
ly completed;" "were transferred;" "As a result of;" "has succeeded;" "Therefore;" 
"will be able," "now being produced;" and "will result in" is the textual equivalent 
of epitrochasmus; that is, "a swift movement from one statement to the next; rapid 
touching on many different points" [Lanham, 1991, p. 70]. 
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There is also a short, almost completely self-contained, five-
sentence, morality-tale narrative of the American success story in 
this passage. It seems fitting that Disney the storyteller would 
incorporate narrative into his CEO discourse in the stockholders' 
letter. After all, if important external constituencies, and internal 
ones as well, buy into top management's strategic narrative, such 
discourse has certainly served its purpose [Barry and Elmes, 
1997]. The uncertainty associated with the business is incorporat-
ed subtly, almost unobtrusively, by the use of words "substantially" 
and "believes" and the rather soft introduction of the threat to 
"sources of income in certain foreign countries now at war." 
The story narrated in this passage seems almost as fictional as 
a Disney cartoon, thereby making the rhetorical quality of the sec-
tion more interesting. The company had borrowed considerably 
to establish its new facilities and expand its work force. It had 
done so believing that more lucrative opportunities would flow 
from animated features rather than from short subjects. But cost 
control problems, some market resistance, and the European war 
had intervened. This had compelled the Disney brothers to do 
something they did not want to do — issue preferred stock to 
reduce part of the debt and provide them with some liquid funds. 
Given these events, it is contestable whether Disney was in con-
trol of his company to the extent that might be demanded. Thus, 
his use of rhetoric was adept and skillful impression management, 
directed to portraying what was arguably a mirage; that is, of 
Disney being decisive and in control of all dimensions of his com-
pany's affairs [Salancik and Meindl, 1984]. 
"EFFECTS OF THE WAR'' and "PRODUCT": The contrast between 
the second and third sections is dramatic. While the second sec-
tion was upbeat and optimistic, there unfolds in the third section 
a series of negative news about the impact of the war, again char-
acteristic of diallage. The first sentence of this section ["The effect 
of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been 
serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined" 
(emphasis added)], stands in stark contrast to the previous sec-
tion's final sentence in which the war was blamed almost as an 
afterthought for making "sources of income in certain foreign 
countries" "no longer available." Why the sharp, sudden alteration 
in message? Perhaps it had to do with Walt Disney's problems as a 
leader and an entrepreneur in 1940. He had an unpalatable story 
to tell in his company's first public annual report, especially about 
the almost catastrophic problems with Pinocchio. According to 
15
Amernic and Craig: Accountability and rhetoric during a crisis: Walt Disney's 1940 letter to stockholders
Published by eGrove, 2000
64 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000 
the 1940 annual report, $1 million of the $2.6 million cost of pro-
ducing this animated feature was written off during the year 
because of the combined effects of market conditions and the 
excessive costs. (See Appendix 1 under the heading "PINOC-
CHIO.") Thus, first serving up some bad news about the impact of 
the war, the effect of which had already been marginalized to 
some degree at the end of the previous section, might be seen as 
a skillful use of "order" as a rhetorical device. 
But the rhetoric is even more skillful and subtle. Disney refers 
to "the" Company on 44 occasions in the letter. Only once, and in 
this section, does he refer to "your" Company. In doing so, he 
heightens the emphatic effect, helping to steer home the implica-
tions of the bad news to shareholders. His tone, for whatever rea-
son, is almost accusatory, as if the shareholders were answerable 
for the bad news. 
The letter begins with very good news about increasing pro-
duction, reducing costs, and anticipating profits. These successes 
were due to factors presumably controllable by management. The 
next section describes the potential impact of the war in very 
general terms — the war being, of course, beyond the control of 
management. The following section, headed "PRODUCT," 
describes the even more sombre news about Pinocchio and the 
possible bad news about Fantasia. The bad news about Pinocchio 
is first reported as due to "the conditions prevailing throughout 
the world" (see subsection headed "PINOCCHIO"), in other 
words, beyond management's control. Despite this, later in the 
same subsection, the letter mentions the company's growth ("the 
transition period through which the Company passed when it 
changed its policy of making one feature in two years...to a policy 
of producing from two to four features a year...") and the "discard-
ed work of untrained personnel," "the schooling and training of 
personnel," and "inadequate plant facilities" before moving into 
the new studio. 
The portion of the third section devoted to Fantasia reminds 
the reader that the company is an innovator, and that innovation 
sometimes requires changing strategies and profit expectations. 
The remainder of the fourth section provides a barrage of upbeat 
news about new animated features, cartoons in process, and other 
sources of revenue. 
Disney's Rhetorical Use of Accounting: Aho [ 1985] and Carruthers 
and Espeland [1991] have argued that accounting is powerfully 
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rhetorical. Disney displayed an innate understanding of this fea-
ture of accounting in his stockholders' letter. Under the heading 
"GENERAL," Disney attacks the strictures of accounting conven-
tion by invoking a statement made in the company's formal, legal 
prospectus inviting subscriptions in the preferred stock issue. The 
portion of the section reads as follows (sentences are numbered 
for reference purposes): 
[Sentence 1] In considering the profit and loss 
statement of the Company, it is worth while to 
repeat the following statement made in the 
prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred 
Stock: 
[Sentence 2] "The Company's principal income 
accrues according to the rapidity with which its 
features are exhibited in theatres and, accordingly, 
the relationship between dates of release and 
dates of accounting periods has in the past pro-
duced and will probably continue in the future to 
produce wide variations in earnings as they may 
from time to time be reported. [Sentence 3] This 
is made more pronounced by a program which 
contemplates the release of only one or two fea-
tures per year. [Sentence 4] In connection with 
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the 
Company adopted a policy of writing off the 
entire cost of the picture against the first revenues 
received, and the Company may in the future fol-
low this policy with respect to all of its feature pro-
ductions. [Sentence 5] Consequently, if any given 
accounting period closes at a time when revenues 
have failed to exceed the costs incurred in con-
nection with the production of a feature released 
during such period, it is possible that a loss may be 
reported in such period notwithstanding the fact 
that an actual profit may eventually be realized on 
such feature." 
In Sentence 1, Disney invokes the authority of the prospectus, 
a legal document that had been approved by the California author-
ities. This appeal to authority, or apomnemonysis [Lanham, 1991, 
p. 191], gives added weight to the text. Such a rhetorical move is 
quite consistent with the central role that appeal to authority, 
often embodied in GAAP, serves in modern accounting. The 
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prospectus excerpt is cited in sentences 2, 3, and 4 to tell of the 
company's virtuous accounting by which the entire cost of ani-
mated features is writ ten off against the first revenues received, a 
conservative accounting policy, at least in the short run. In sen-
tence 5, the excerpt suggests strongly that resulting accounting 
losses are an artifact of the interplay between this conservative 
accounting policy and the arbitrariness of the relationship 
between accounting periods and revenues. In effect, Disney sig-
nals to the letter's readers the company's sobriety of purpose by 
using a conservative method of accounting.11 But he then draws 
upon this excerpt from the preferred stock prospectus to urge 
readers not to take the resultant accounting too seriously. 
Rhetorically, he seems to want to have it both ways; e.g., conser-
vative accounting shows evidence of the social virtue of conser-
vatism, but accounting itself can be relied upon only to an extent. 
Can he have it both ways?12 Can Disney both draw upon the 
authority of accounting to influence readers and almost at the 
same time plead the arbitrariness of certain accounting conven-
tions, such as the accounting period convention? Accounting is 
such a rhetorically serviceable and elastic mode of representation 
and argument that it is not surprising that Disney, the creative sto-
ryteller, employs it thus. 
However, the conservative method of revenue recognition 
chosen by Disney had a decidedly unconservative side as well. 
Feature animated films whose costs had been fully recovered 
could be taken off the shelf and distributed again with 100% of the 
producer 's revenues during these re-releases going directly to the 
company's before-tax profits. This happened with Snow White in 
1940—that year's income statement in the annual report included 
revenues of $103,526 from the reissue of Snow White, but 
revealed no costs in 1940 since all production costs for the picture 
had been recovered in previous years. So the conservative 
accounting used by Disney had a temporal dimension—very con-
servative in early years in which feature film production activity 
was high and unconservative once such features were completed 
11Indeed, the financial statement footnotes in the 1940 annual report reveal 
the method of accounting to be conservative twice over. Not only were profits on 
an animated feature not admitted to the company's accounting system until all of a 
feature's costs of production had been recovered, but Disney did not account for 
any revenues at all until cash was received from a film's distributor. 
12A reviewer raised this dual nature of accounting argument in the stockhold-
ers' letter. 
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and went into re-release. Since 1940 was one of these "early years," 
this unconservative side remained unobtrusive during the crucial 
year of 1940. 
In the 1941 stockholders' letter, Walt Disney demonstrated fur-
ther his rhetorical capability to use accounting strategically. He 
constructed, or more likely had his accountants construct, a 
detailed accounting comparison between the company's 1941 and 
its 1940 results. He included this comparison near the beginning 
of the 1941 letter (see Appendix 2). He was using accounting 
information to show that in spite of a reported loss of $789,297 in 
1941, many features highlighted in this artfully constructed com-
parison suggested strongly that great progress had been made in 
1941 as compared with 1940. Constructing such an unusual 
accounting schedule and placing it near the front of his stock-
holders' letter, where it more or less dominated and conditioned 
perceptions of the rest of the letter and perhaps the rest of the 
entire 1941 annual report, was a skillful rhetorical move. The 
authority of the accounting information used, drawn from the 
audited financial statements, was apomnemonysis combined with 
"order" in persuasive harmony. 
The "Summary of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement," 
presented in the 1941 Stockholders' Letter, seems skillful rhetori-
cally in another sense as well. It presented a gross mass of num-
bers across 3 x 8 digit columns, 26 rows long. Clearly, the notions 
of accounting materiality and "rounding" had not been embraced 
by Disney or his accounting advisors, as the financial data were 
presented to the precise dollar and cent. Although this may have 
reflected Disney's reputation for "attention to detail," it may also 
have been a rhetorical ploy. This so-called "Summary" was a visual 
onslaught likely to test, and find wanting, all but the most deter-
mined, accounting-trained readers. Perhaps it was a visual 
metaphor used as a rhetorical device, a way for Disney to vent his 
frustration with the complexity and confounding nature of 
accounting methods and practices. For such a skillful graphic 
artist, one who was renowned for the most beautiful of screen 
images, the "Financial Summary" was out of character. Whereas 
Disney was a creative graphic artist, adept at fashioning com-
pelling and beautiful screen images, when it came to conscripting 
something as mundane as accounting data to craft the (financial) 
story he wished to tell, the end result was metaphorically a bar-
rage of numbers bereft of aesthetic appeal, but perhaps a classic 
rhetoric move. More simply however, this could have merely been 
brother Roy's influence. 
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The Rhetoric of an Accountability Document: It is not surprising 
to find that the 1940 letter to stockholders was well constructed 
rhetorically. After all, Walt Disney had by this time a universal rep-
utation as a master storyteller. So why would he not use this talent 
in telling his company's financial story during a period of crisis in 
a way that might be expected to garner positive reaction from his 
audience? Financial reporting, in both its qualitative and quantita-
tive aspects, is like all text, and discourse generally, unavoidably 
rhetorical. Disney was as skilled at giving a financial account as he 
was at giving an account of Mickey's latest adventure. 
Understanding the inherent rhetorical nature of such discourse is 
important to understanding the role such discourse plays in 
accountability. 
Indeed, in any accountability document (such as a set of audit-
ed financial statements, a stockholders' letter, a variance report, a 
corporate press release), there is a vast array of rhetorical choices 
available which the author might apply with greater or lesser 
degrees of awareness. Such choices, made even subconsciously by 
the author, influence the perceptions of the audience. Our analy-
sis of some rhetoric features of Disney's letter has merely touched 
the surface of possibilities; for example, we might have explored 
more deeply the argument schemes apparent in the letter 
[Warnick and Kline, 1992], examined ways in which the letter 
dealt rhetorically with its composite audiences [Myers, 1999], ana-
lyzed text structure, and metadiscourse [Hyland, 1998], etc. 
Having established, we submit, that the letter was crafted skillful-
ly in a rhetorical sense, we now focus our attention on the nexus 
between rhetoric and ideology. We read Disney's letter with 
metaphor uppermost in mind since it is largely through metaphor 
that we might begin to understand a text's "ideological agenda 
that is apt to be hidden from view" [Postman, 1993, p. 124]. 
METAPHOR IN THE 1940 LETTER 
Metaphor is a central aspect of rhetoric. Among recent con-
tributors to the extensive literature on metaphor, Eubanks [ 1999, 
p. 195] has made a case that: 
...metaphor is rhetorically constituted. No 
metaphor is spoken or written except in the con-
text of a sociohistorically bound communicative 
situation. Therefore, all metaphors are inflected by 
politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, 
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professional commitments, and personal attitudes 
— in short by the whole of our cultural and con-
ceptual repertoire. Because metaphors are inflect-
ed, we cannot explain how they work unless we 
consider concrete instances of metaphor, taking 
into account how inflections constrain the way 
metaphors are uttered and understood. 
Eubanks asserted that metaphors are "fundamentally respon-
sive," and thus cannot be understood by themselves (i.e., "atom-
ized"), but rather only in relation to "metaphoric and literal con-
cepts that are already in motion within a culture's (or subcul-
ture's) discourse." As a consequence: 
Because metaphors are concretely responsive and 
because competen t speakers and wri ters are 
aware, consciously and unconsciously, of the 
interplay of metaphors and concepts, the utter-
ance of a metaphor carries rhetorical benefits or 
costs...Speakers and writers build consensus and 
risk rhetorical capital when selecting and reen-
voicing metaphors. However, they manage that 
risk complexly by claiming, ascribing, and shifting 
the metaphors they utter [Eubanks, 1999, pp. 195-
196]. 
Metaphor theory has a long, rich, and unsettled history. Some 
contend that metaphor is simply flowery but unnecessary. But 
many scholars would agree with Postman [1996, p. 174] that "a 
metaphor is not an ornament. It is an organ of perception." 
Others suggest intriguingly that thought itself is fundamentally 
metaphorical [Gibbs, 1994], and that metaphorical language is 
merely the surface manifestation of an underlying cognitive map-
ping between two domains—a target domain and a source domain 
[Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993]. Considerable persuasive 
evidence, much of it summarized by Gibbs [1994], provides sup-
port for the view that metaphor is basic to thought, and that there 
are systematic relationships among metaphorical structures. For 
example, Lakoff [1993, pp. 222-224] wrote about a metaphorical 
mapping hierarchy whose highest level is the fundamental "event 
structure" metaphor. 
Scholars in a wide variety of fields have taken up the serious-
ness of metaphor. Harrington [1995] argued persuasively that 
German race ideology was made more virulent through 
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metaphoric processes; Dunn [1990] showed how the "root 
metaphor" of the new industrial relations has facilitated the erec-
tion of a new industrial relations paradigm; Miller and Fredericks 
[1990] argued that metaphors used in a major educational policy 
document revealed a particular ideological predisposition that 
foreclosed alternative recommendations; Daughton [1993] 
claimed that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's use of metaphor of a 
holy war contributed to the immediate impact and enduring influ-
ence of his first inaugural speech; and Postman [1996, p. 174] 
pleaded rhetorically and, of course, metaphorically to educators 
by asking: "Do I exaggerate in saying that a student cannot under-
stand what a subject is about without some understanding of the 
metaphors that are its foundation?" 
We suggest that the metaphor, "the company is a sentient 
being on a purposeful journey traversing an at-times hostile envi-
ronment," permeates the 1940 Disney stockholders' letter, and 
that this metaphor is consistent with the fundamental and perva-
sive event-structure metaphor hierarchy described by Lakoff 
[1993]. Evidence supporting this contention includes the follow-
ing metaphoric language from the section headed "NEW STU-
DIO": (1) "...the Company was constructing and equipping its new 
studio," (2) "...the Company's production operations...," (3) "...the 
Company has been able to augment its production...," (4) "...the 
Company will be able to carry out its new policy..." These may be 
argued to be instances of verbal reification, but they are also 
instances of attributing sentience and purposiveness to the 
Company. Such ways of talking and writing about companies are 
commonplace, and it is perhaps because they are commonplace 
that they are rhetorically important. 
There are numerous other instances of reification of the com-
pany as an active agent that has commercial "affairs" (e.g., "EFFECT 
OF THE WAR": "The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of 
your Company..."); that takes action (e.g., "PRODUCT": "...the 
Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc."); that enjoys ben-
efits (e.g., "PINOCCHIO": "...there have accrued to the credit of the 
Company..."); that creates saleable names and characters (e.g., 
"SHORT SUBJECTS"); that has expectations about the future (e.g., 
"GENERAL": "...the Company expects to have three new feature 
pictures in general release..."), etc. Perhaps the most important 
language manifestation of this metaphor is under the heading 
"PINOCCHIO" in which Disney writes: "...the transition period 
through which the Company passed when it changed its policy of 
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making one feature in two years...to a policy of producing from 
two to four features a year." Here, we have a company that not only 
pursues the sentient activity of changing a policy, but also has to 
endure passage through a transition period on its journey. 
An obvious objection to this analysis might be that these are 
merely words, and besides, many managers talk and write about 
their company in similar ways. But that is the point; "managers 
work with words" [Jonsson, 1998, p. 411]. The modern theory of 
metaphor suggests strongly that words matter because they influ-
ence the way those uttering those words think and act. 
Calling a company "a sentient being on a purposeful journey 
traversing an at-times hostile environment" has several implica-
tions and entailments. The company, a sentient being, knows best 
through its means of cognition and decision making (i.e., its lead-
ership) about its goals and how to achieve them; about which path 
through the at-times hostile environment to take; and how to 
adapt when circumstances change. Therefore, acknowledging the 
interests of other stakeholders is limited and perhaps utilitarian. 
These other stakeholders are not part of the being itself (i.e., the 
company) unless they submit to the authority of the company as a 
sentient being—a strongly managerialist view. Further, any obsta-
cles in the path are adversaries and goals are non-negotiable.13 To 
see the consistency of these ideas in Disney's managerial dis-
course, we take a brief look at the 1941 stockholders' letter (see 
Appendix 2). 
In the section "LABOR RELATIONS" in the 1941 stockholders' 
letter, Disney describes the company's journey as "beset by labor 
troubles" and ventures the observation that this obstacle to pur-
poseful travel has occurred in 1941 "[f]or the first time in its his-
tory." This section describes Disney's view of the famous 1941 
strike, a view in sharp contrast to Disney's hostile, and perhaps at 
13A reviewer, rightly in our view, proffered objections to a version of this 
metaphor which we called "the company is a sentient being on a purposeful jour-
ney" as follows: "Could there be an explanation that is a little less grand? Basic com-
pany law tells us that limited liability companies enjoy separate legal form. It could 
simply be that what is seen here is a playing out of that, with the company being 
accorded its own identity in the text as a consequence of this commonplace 
usage..." While undoubtedly this is true, a reader of Disney's stockholders' letter 
would be prudent not to ignore the strong, pervasive strain of Midwestern inde-
pendence that several scholars have attributed to Walt Disney [Bryman, 1995; 
Schickel, 1968/1997; Watts, 1997] and which seems to have conditioned greatly his 
conception and attitudes towards his company, the product of his creative, emo-
tional, and physical labors. 
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times illegal, anti-union activity summarized in Boje [1995], 
Schickel [1968/1997], and Watts [1997]. If we think of a "compa-
ny as a sentient being on a purposeful journey," then what do we 
think of the people who attempt to unionize and impede the jour-
ney? Disney characterizes the 1941 cutbacks which led in part to 
the union activity and to a subsequent strike as a 
"program...designed to bring output in line with results reason-
ably to be anticipated from the distribution of the Company's pic-
tures under present world conditions." He portrayed it as a tech-
nical problem that required a reasonable technical solution. Thus, 
the union advocates and strikers, who Boje [1995, pp. 1014-1015] 
pointed out had several complaints about their inequitable treat-
ment by Disney, were the source of the "labor troubles" that 
"beset" the company. The impression is one of Big Labor and its 
goons ganging up on the company (the American Federation Of 
Labor is mentioned, as are "secondary boycotts" and "'hot cargo' 
activities"). The arbitration award is described as being "imposed" 
on the company (the word is used twice in the section). So the 
metaphor established in the 1940 stockholders' letter is carried 
over to the 1941 letter and is consistent in its entailments: unrea-
sonable employees joined a union and went on strike, preventing 
the company from implementing a reasonable program to help it 
on its journey. Then, despite "[r]epeated efforts by the Company 
to effect a settlement," government came in and arbitrated a set-
tlement, which imposed several bad things, further impeding the 
journey. However, everything "is now operating smoothly" in 
spite of these obstacles. 
Despite these comforting words, Disney was apparently in no 
mood to have future journeys disrupted by what he regarded as 
ideologically perverted union behavior. The 1941 strike is said to 
have caused him to become "a militant anti-communist" and, in 
the 1950s, "a [secret] special FBI agent charged with passing on 
information about supposed communist infiltration" of 
Hollywood [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8]. His embrace of a 
business structure of vertical integration in which, for example, 
his company controls not only the production of film and televi-
sion programs, but also controls their distribution and associated 
product licensing and retail merchandising sales, points to the 
adoption of the metaphor of the uninterrupted journey as a tan-
gible business goal. 
Carrier [1997, p. 51] described "a public language" of "the 
Market model" which he alleged: 
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...provides the vocabulary and conceptual equip-
ment that make it relatively easy to define certain 
sorts of things as problems and relatively hard to 
define other sorts of things that way. Just as it 
influences the sorts of problems that can be 
addressed, so it influences what is likely to appear 
as an acceptable, plausible solution. 
Like a lingua franca, such a version of the "Market" helps create "an 
external reality that [people] have to adopt if they are to commu-
nicate with others" [Carrier, 1997, p. 49]. Carrier was concerned 
with the idea of the "Free Market" in the 1990s, and how such a 
richly complex metaphor affects people's arguments, decisions, 
and public debates. He traced the most important historical roots 
of the "Market" to 18th and 19th century Britain. Importantly for 
purposes of this paper, he concluded that "...in popular con-
sciousness the idea flourishes best in the United States, with its 
long traditions of that secular, acquisitive individualism and con-
cern with equality of process rather than of outcome that form 
part of the Market" [Carrier, 1997, p. vii]. 
Disney's ideological notion of his company is metaphorical in 
the same sense as Carrier's notion of the "Market." Disney's com-
pany is related intimately to Carrier's "Market," for the company 
metaphorically pursues its life-journey largely by entering into 
transactions within the ambit of this metaphorical market. And 
since, as Carrier [1997] reminded us, such a metaphorical market 
is a "Free Market," anything that interferes with such metaphorical 
freedom is to be treated with non-metaphorical hostility (e.g., the 
national labor union with which Disney's striking employees 
allied themselves in 1941). Perhaps warfare was not restricted, 
metaphorically or otherwise, just to Europe in 1941. 
Eubanks' [1999, p. 195] contention that "all metaphors are 
inflected by politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, pro-
fessional commitments, and personal attitudes" seems apt here 
since the fiercely independent and self-made Disney probably 
could conceive of his company in no way other than the 
metaphoric representation described above. His discourse in the 
1940 and 1941 stockholders' letters set out his ideology and phi-
losophy of management and management control. Such discourse 
represented, in effect, the way he made sense of the world. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have used the themes of rhetoric and metaphor to exam-
ine the 1940 stockholders' letter of Walt Disney Productions, the 
first such accountability document signed by Walt Disney, and, to 
a lesser extent, the 1941 letter. These letters provide an account-
ing, a story, that Disney intended to craft within the confines of 
the tensions between his company's financial exigencies and his 
creative, iconic persona. Walt Disney was as skilled in designing 
financial reporting and accountability narrative and discourse as 
he was in creating animated cartoons and features. The letters 
seem crafted with the goal to forge allegiance with the new pre-
ferred stockholders firmly in mind in spite of his strong resent-
ment. And if we take seriously the current literature of cognitive 
metaphor, the letters also reveal features of Disney's thinking, 
especially about key social and economic institutions. In sum, 
although the narrative part of financial accounting examined here 
is rhetorically and linguistic complex, the analyses conducted 
expose the types of insights that help render management and the 
companies they lead more understandable. Disney as accountant 
was ever as complex as Disney the cultural icon. 
An ongoing and important task addressed by historians is that 
of revealing and analyzing the character, personality, and behavior 
of corporations and their CEOs. In pursuing that task, important 
insights about corporations and individuals have been sourced 
from many quarters. But rarely have historians delved into the 
narrative discourse of CEOs in annual reports when seeking to 
add to the arsenal of information they marshal in support of bio-
graphic profiles, corporate histories, or other historical text. This 
paper provides an example of how analysis of narrative discourse 
by CEOs in annual reports can add to and enrich understanding of 
leading corporations and their chief executives. 
The insights offered through adoption of a "close reading" of 
CEO text have been demonstrated clearly here. By focusing on the 
rhetorical, metaphorical, and ideological features of Walt Disney's 
1940 letter to stockholders, insight into the behavior and charac-
ter of Walt Disney and the Disney Corporation is provided. Our 
analysis reveals Walt Disney to be a skillful, yet subtle rhetorician, 
whose rhetorical capabilities encompass a deft capacity to manip-
ulate accounting data strategically. Disney was not only a master 
storyteller in the surreal surrounds of the cinema where he could 
exploit the glitz and glamor of visual and sound imagery. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, he is revealed as very adept also in a grey 
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and glamor-free domain with which few would remotely imagine 
associating him — financial reporting. Our analysis reveals Disney 
as a very clever storyteller in weaving rhetorical magic in the 
realm of the mundane — accountability narratives in an annual 
report. 
By exploring Disney's use of metaphor, we show how further 
perspectives can be developed and how this assists us in entering 
theoretical speculations about Disney's ideological motivations. 
Our analysis yields results which, in the main, are contrary to the 
popular, ambient image of Walt Disney; that is, as the wholesome, 
friendly "Uncle Walt." Somewhat perversely, we find evidence 
consistent with what we reported earlier as Walt Disney's "darker 
side." He is revealed as something of an enigma, the cultural icon 
who seemed almost as adept at crafting financial narrative in a 
hard-nosed business world as he was at fashioning animation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Letter to Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions 
Annual Report 
To the Stockholders of Walt Disney Productions: 
In April, 1940, Walt Disney Productions sought and obtained the participation of the public 
in its business through the sale of 155,000 shares of 6% Cumulative Convertible Preferred 
Stock, and the Board of Directors herewith submits its first annual report to the Company's 
new stockholders. 
Included herein are financial statements of the Company for the fiscal year ended September 
28, 1940, accompanied by the report of the Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & 
Co. We invite your attention to the notes which are attached to and constitute an integral par t 
of the financial statements. 
Your management believes that it will be of interest to our 1,800 stockholders to supplement 
the information shown in the financial statements with the following additional facts pertain-
ing to the Company. 
NEW STUDIO 
At the time of the sale of the 6% Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was constructing 
and equipping its new studio. This studio was substantially completed and equipped and vir-
tually all of the Company's production operations were transferred thereto by the end of May, 
1940. As a result of the increased facilities, the Company has been able to augment its produc-
tion of completed footage by more than 100% and has succeeded in lowering the cost of pro-
duction per foot substantially. Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its new policy 
of releasing two or more feature subjects each year as well as a large number of short subjects. 
As a result of the reduction in costs, short subjects are now being produced at a figure which 
the management believes will result in profitable releases even though sources of income in 
certain foreign countries now at war are no longer available. 
EFFECT OF THE WAR 
The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been serious and the 
full measure thereof cannot yet be determined. It has been impossible to effect an orderly 
release of the Company's pictures in any of the countries at war and in many countries it has 
been impossible to effect any release whatsoever. In fact, in most of the territories dominated 
by the Axis Powers, the release of American pictures has been forbidden. In addition, curren-
cy restrictions and regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, have served to 
reduce further the Company's income from such pictures as were already released in foreign 
countries. 
PRODUCT 
During the year, the Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., the organization cur-
rently distributing our pictures, one feature picture and ten short subjects and has in current 
production a number of other features and short subjects. Developments in connection with 
the Company's product are summarized as follows: 
PINOCCHIO: 
PINOCCHIO was first shown at the Center Theatre in New York on February 7, 1940, and 
at the Pantages and Hillstreet Theatres in Los Angeles on February 10, 1940. It was subse-
quently released for general exhibition on February 23, 1940. To the end of the Company's fis-
cal year, September 28, 1940, this picture had earned gross world film rentals of $ 1,673,956.54 
of which $1,627,331.79 represented film rentals from the United States and Canada. The 
Company has received from its distributors as its net share of the world film rentals, 
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$976,211.94. In addition, there have accrued to the credit of the Company, certain funds in 
Great Britain and Australasia amounting to £5818.7.5, which have been blocked by currency 
restrictions. 
The Company has prepared Spanish and Portuguese language versions of this picture 
which are currently being shown in all the countries of Central and South America, as well as 
in the Philippine Islands and Portugal. No income from the Spanish and Portuguese language 
versions of PINOCCHIO is reflected in the above-mentioned film rentals as the picture was 
released in those countries too late for any such revenue to be included in the year ended 
September 28, 1940. 
The total cost of producing PINOCCHIO was $2,595,379.66 and it is now anticipated that 
this amount will not be recouped under the conditions prevailing throughout the world. 
Accordingly, a charge of $1,000,000 has been made to provide for the excess of cost of this pic-
ture over the estimated total revenue. 
The picture PINOCCHIO was planned and production was started prior to the outbreak 
of the European war. Consequently, it was budgeted on a program contemplating income from 
all countries where SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS had been released. In addition, 
this production suffered from excessive cost which was a direct result of the transition period 
through which the Company passed when it changed its policy of making one feature in two 
years (SNOW WHITE was released in January, 1938), to a policy of producing from two to four 
features a year as presently projected. These excessive costs cannot be segregated as they very 
largely represent discarded work of untrained personnel. PINOCCHIO was produced during a 
period of development and expansion. These factors which included the schooling and train-
ing of personnel to meet the increased production needs, together with inadequate plant facil-
ities at the old studios, contributed in no small measure to the high cost of this production. 
FANTASIA: 
FANTASIA was exhibited for the first time at the Broadway Theatre in New York on 
November 13, 1940. This picture is an innovation in the field of entertainment, featuring 
Leopold Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra in a program of music as interpreted by 
Walt Disney and the Company's staff of artists and technicians. FANTASIA is being presented 
by methods never before employed in the exhibition of motion pictures. The exhibition of this 
production requires special sound equipment and the Company has contracted to purchase 
sufficient equipment so that the picture can be distributed simultaneously in twelve theatres. 
It is now planned to distribute the picture by the "road show" method in the first-run cities of 
the United States, Canada and other large centers. The management believes this method of 
distribution will result in an eventual realization of revenue in excess of that which would be 
realized by ordinary methods of distribution. However, this method of distribution will require 
a longer period of time for the Company to recoup the cost of the picture. 
OTHER FEATURES: 
Three other feature length pictures currently in production are planned for release dur-
ing the fiscal year ending September 27, 1941. THE RELUCTANT DRAGON is a combination of 
animated cartoon and "live action" comedy, featuring the well-known humorist, Robert 
Benchley BAMBI is a dramatization, through the medium of the animated cartoon, of the well-
known book of the same name by Felix Salten. A distribution contract for both of the last-men-
tioned features has been entered into with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. The name and basic story 
of the picture, DUMBO, THE FLYING ELEPHANT were purchased by the Company and are 
being developed by our staff into a feature length cartoon. 
Among the features scheduled for release in 1942 are PETER PAN and WIND IN THE WIL-
LOWS. 
SHORT SUBJECTS: 
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940 the Company delivered to RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc. a total of ten short subjects and contemplates delivery of twenty short subjects 
during the fiscal year 1941. These pictures continue in high popular favor and should prove to 
be a profitable part of the Company's business inasmuch as the increased efficiency made pos-
sible by the new plant has materially reduced production costs. 
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The Company has recently extended its releasing contract with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 
to cover a fourth series of eighteen short subjects. 
The Company presently has twenty-eight short subjects in various stages of production. 
OTHER ENDEAVORS 
Names and characters created by the Company and licensed for use on merchandise, etc. con-
tinue to have a wide-spread appeal. Royalties from this source, from books and music, and rev-
enue from comic strips and art sales, constitute a substantial portion of the income of the 
Company. 
GENERAL 
The inventory of pictures in process at the close of the fiscal year was the largest in the 
Company's history. The total cost of the feature length and short subjects in production was 
$3,650,256.67. These pictures represented a total film length of 44,490 feet. In addition there 
were 149 stories in our inventory on which we had spent $367,275.41. The system of budget 
control both as to cost and output was revised when the Company moved to the new studio, 
with the result that both feature pictures and short subjects are presently being completed on 
schedule and at their budgeted costs. 
Your management has reduced expenses and has taken aggressive steps toward lowering 
production costs by increasing efficiency and eliminating dispensable activities. 
In considering the profit and loss statement of the Company, it is worth while to repeat 
the following statement made in the prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred Stock: 
"The Company's principal income accrues according to the rapidity with which its features are 
exhibited in theatres and, accordingly, the relationship between dates of release and dates of 
accounting periods has in the past produced and will probably continue in the future to pro-
duce wide variations in earnings as they may from time to time be reported. This is made more 
pronounced by a program which contemplates the release of only one or two features per year. 
In connection with SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the Company adopted a policy 
of writing off the entire cost of the picture against the first revenues received, and the 
Company may in the future follow this policy with respect to all of its feature productions. 
Consequently, if any given accounting period closes at a time when revenues have failed to 
exceed the costs incurred in connection with the production of a feature released during such 
period, it is possible that a loss may be reported in such period notwithstanding the fact that 
an actual profit may eventually be realized on such feature." 
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940, the Company had only one new feature 
picture-PINOCCHIO-in release. 
The Company also re-issued SNOW WHITE in the United States and Canada in July, 1940. 
This was released as the WALT DISNEY FESTIVAL in conjunction with four Walt Disney short 
subjects and is currently doing a satisfactory business. 
During the next fiscal year ending September 27, 1941, the Company expects to have 
three new feature pictures in general release, in addition to its quota of new short subjects. 
These pictures should reflect the benefit accruing to the Company by reason of the training 
and skill acquired by the artists during the last three years. While the serious effect on the 
Company's business caused by the loss of foreign markets cannot be minimized, nevertheless 
your management now believes it has adjusted the Company's operations to a schedule of pro-
duction and costs designed to be independent of those markets. 
CAPITAL STOCK 
At a meeting of the directors held on February 24, 1940, the capital stock of the Company was 
reclassified into 755,000 shares, of which 600,000 shares were designated as Common Stock 
(with a par value of $5 a share), and 155,000 shares were designated as 6% Cumulative 
Convertible Preferred Stock (with a par value of $25 per share). 300,000 shares of Common 
Stock ($5 par value) were thereupon issued in exchange for 150,000 shares of Common Stock 
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($10 par value) previously outstanding, and 45,000 shares of Common Stock were issued as a 
15% stock dividend on the new amount of outstanding stock. 10,000 shares of Common Stock 
were issued to Walter E. Disney and Roy O. Disney in consideration of the cancellation of 
$200,000 indebtedness of the Company to them. 150,000 shares of preferred Stock were sold 
to the public through underwriters for net proceeds of $3,412,500 and 5,000 shares were sold 
to officers and employees for $125,000. 
An initial dividend of 37 l /2c was paid July 1, 1940, to the Preferred stockholders of 
record June 15, 1940, and a regular quarterly dividend of 37 l /2c was paid October 1, 1940, to 
Preferred stockholders of record September 16, 1940. The regular quarterly dividend of 37 
l /2c payable January 1, 1941, to Preferred stockholders of record December 16, 1940, was 
declared by the Board of Directors at a meeting held December 2, 1940. This dividend will be 
paid from the Company's initial surplus. No dividends were paid on the Common Stock. 
DIRECTORS 
During the year, Edward M. Francis resigned as a director of the Company and in his place the 
board elected Jonathan B. Lovelace as the representative of the Preferred stockholders in antic-
ipation of Paragraph 9 of Article 5 of the Articles of Incorporation, as amended, which pro-
vides that: 
"Holders of the Preferred Stock, voting separately as a class and entitled to one vote per share, 
shall be entitled at the first annual meeting of the Corporation after the close of the fiscal year 
ending September 28, 1940, and annually thereafter, to elect one Director of the Corporation 
to hold office for a term of one (1) year and until his successor shall have been elected.'' 
EMPLOYEES 
At September 28, 1940, the organization consisted of a total of 1179 employees. 
The Directors want to take this opportunity of thanking all members of the organization, 
whose loyalty and co-operation have contributed in such large measure to the continued 
progress of the Company. 
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
WALTER E. DISNEY, President. 
APPENDIX 2 
Letter to Stockholders for the 1941 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report 
To the Stockholders of Walt Disney Productions: 
We submit herewith as part of this annual report to stockholders financial statements of 
the Company for the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, accompanied by the report of the 
Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. We direct your attention to the notes 
which are attached to and constitute an integral part of the financial statements. 
FOREWORD 
In our annual report to stockholders issued in December, 1940, and covering the fiscal 
year ended September 28, 1940, we stated, "the effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of 
your Company has been serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined." It was 
evident that the loss of foreign markets necessitated a sharp lowering in production costs in 
order to assure a profit from the remaining markets. The Company immediately took steps 
toward that objective. Since the date of that report there has been a further deterioration in 
the foreign markets and the Company again found it necessary to reduce materially its operat-
ing expenses and personnel in order to consolidate its position. As this program was being 
placed in effect, a strike was called by a minority group of the Company's employees. This 
development, discussed later in this report under the heading "Labor Relations," resulted in a 
retardation of our production schedule and interfered with the delivery and exhibition of 
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product already completed. 
Following is a summary of income account and balance sheet items taken from the finan-
cial statements published on pages 8 to 10 of this report, compared with corresponding fig-
ures in last year's report: 
Fiscal year 
Income Account 
Income from short subjects less 
amortization 
Income from royalties, comic strips, 
art work, licenses, etc., less costs 
Income from "Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarfs" 
Total 
Administrative and selling expenses 
Balance 
Interest expense 
Profit (loss) before provision 
for losses on features 
Provision for excess cost of features 
over estimated net income 
Balance (loss) 
Balance Sheets 
Cash and receivables 
Inventories at cost: 
Pictures in process, etc. 
Unamortized picture costs 
Total current and working assets, 
before deducting reserves 
Deduct provision for excess of 
cost over estimated net income 
from feature pictures 
Current and working assets 
as per balance sheet 
Bank loans 
Other liabilities, reserve for taxes 
and deferred income 
Total liabilities 
Excess of current and working as-
sets (as stated) over all liabilities 
Deposits in foreign banks at current 
rates 
Land, buildings and equipment at 
cost less reserve for depreciation 
Copyrights, trademarks and patents 
less reserve for amortization 
Deferred charges 
Total net assets, as per balance 
sheet 
Funds not taken into books 
representing blocked currencies at 

















































































The comparative figures taken from the income account show the progress made in 
reduction of costs. The Company shows a profit, after all charges but before provision for 
excess cost of feature pictures over estimated net income therefrom, of $210,702.94 as com-
1941 1940 
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pared with a loss of $259,798.05 in the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940. The income 
account does not reflect the reduction in costs of feature pictures as DUMBO was not released 
until after the close of the fiscal year. It does, however, reflect the working off of the invento-
ry of high cost shorts and restoration of a satisfactory profit in that division. Last year the 
Company provided a reserve of $1,000,000 to write off the excess cost of PINOCCHIO. The 
Company has estimated its expectancy of return from all of its feature product, and as a result 
has set up a provision against a possible loss in the amount of $ 1,000,000. 
The comparative figures taken from the Balance Sheet show that while pictures in 
process have decreased $1,210,406.51, the unamortized value of completed pictures has 
increased $3,040,569.50, giving a net increase in inventory (before reserve) of $1,830,162.99. 
This increase, which was largely financed by bank loans, is due primarily to the delay in the 
general release of FANTASIA, and to labor difficulties experienced at the time of release of THE 
RELUCTANT DRAGON. The Company now has two feature pictures ready for general release, 
DUMBO and FANTASIA. A third feature, BAMBI, is practically completed. With current opera-
tions reduced by 50% from last year, a steady reduction of the bank loan is anticipated. 
Blocked currencies are not included in the Company's accounts until received. In 
October, 1941, the British Government entered into an agreement with the motion picture 
companies whereby 50% of the blocked currencies previously impounded in Great Britain was 
released. One-half of this amount was immediately payable and one-half is payable in April, 
1942. The Company, since the date of this report, has received approximately $65,000 as part 
payment of its share of impounded funds. Australia and New Zealand have not yet released any 
of that portion of our revenue which those countries impounded. 
PRODUCT 
During the fiscal year under review the Company released its feature picture FANTASIA. 
Initially this picture was distributed directly by the Company through the medium of road 
shows using "Fantasound" rather than through normal distribution channels. The picture was 
presented in thirteen cities (New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, 
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Minneapolis, Washington and Baltimore) and 
while a few of the engagements were disappointing, the aggregate results indicated a picture 
with wide appeal. The length of the New York and Los Angeles runs broke all existing records 
since the advent of sound. 
Experience gained from the exhibition of FANTASIA in the above-mentioned cities 
demonstrated that a nation wide distribution of this picture with "Fantasound" was impracti-
cal. It was therefore decided to abandon "Fantasound" and generally release the picture 
through normal distribution channels. Our sound engineers succeeded in combining the var-
ious "Fantasound" tracks into one composite track, enabling the Company to present FANTA-
SIA in motion pictures everywhere. 
The company entered into an agreement with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. for the distribu-
tion of FANTASIA throughout the world. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been prepared 
for the South American market, and the picture has already been released in Rio de Janeiro and 
Sao Paulo, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay and Buenos Aires, Argentina. FANTASIA is also being 
currently released in England and Australasia. 
It is now planned to place FANTASIA in general distribution in the United States imme-
diately following DUMBO. In preparation for this general release, test runs were made in rep-
resentative small towns to guide in editing this picture. 
THE RELUCTANT DRAGON 
This picture was completed and delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on April 17, 1941. 
It was first put into general release on June 20, 1941. Revenues obtained from this picture were 
seriously affected by the strike, due to picketing at various theatres throughout the country. It 
has been released in Great Britain and Australasia. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been 
prepared for the release of the picture in South America. 
Although results to date have been disappointing, we are confident of the return to the 
Company of at least $500,000 and have provided in the inventory reserve for the balance of 
the cost. 
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DUMBO 
DUMBO was completed and delivered to our distributor September 11, 1941. Because of 
selling conditions in the industry the picture was not generally released until the middle of 
December. The picture was pre-shown in the Broadway Theatre, New York, beginning 
October 23rd, and has been well received. In the trade and press it is getting excellent 
exploitation and publicity. 
DUMBO is our first all-cartoon feature picture budgeted and produced subsequent to the 
outbreak of the European war and the loss of our foreign markets. The picture was produced 
at a cost well within present market possibilities and is of a quality that assures, in our opinion, 
a profitable return. 
SHORT SUBJECTS 
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, the Company delivered to RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc. a total of twenty-two short subjects. Our costs have been reduced to meet present 
market conditions and the pictures continue to be a profitable source of revenue. 
Under date of April 11, 1941, the Company extended its releasing contract with RKO to 
cover a fifth series of eighteen short subjects. 
The Company now has 22 short subjects in various stages of production. 
BAMBI 
The Company's feature picture BAMBI has been in work for over three years and is now 
practically completed. As now scheduled it will be delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on or 
about the first of February, 1942. Completion of this picture was delayed at least three months 
by the strike. It was the last of the feature pictures projected on the basis of the pre-war mar-
kets. Its cost will be substantially higher than DUMBO but will be approximately $1,000,000 
less than the cost of PINOCCHIO. It is the consensus of opinion of those who have seen the 
picture that it is the best the Company has ever produced for entertainment value and quality 
of production. 
FEATURES RELEASED IN PRIOR YEARS 
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, PINOCCHIO, which was first shown on 
February 7, 1940, returned a gross film rental of $554,730.74 of which the Company's share 
amounted to $387,100.12. This brought the total gross film rental on September 27, 1941, to 
$2,228,687.28 of which the Company's share was $1,363,312.06. The amount received in 1941 
would seem to assure recoupment of the balance of the unamortized negative cost of 
$233,439.64 after giving effect to the reserve set up last year. The Company's share of blocked 
currencies resulting from the showings of PINOCCHIO had a value at official rates of approx-
imately $240,000 at September 27, 1941. This amount is not included in the figures quoted 
above. 
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS which was first shown in December of 1937 
returned to the Company the sum of $139,173.23 in the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941. 
OTHER ENDEAVORS 
The licensing of names and characters created by the Company continues to have uni-
versal commercial appeal but revenue has fallen off during the year mainly because FANTASIA 
did not lend itself readily to such exploitation. Certain of our licensees also were beginning to 
feel the effect of defense priorities. However, royalties from this source and from books, music, 
comic strips and art sales continue to be substantial sources of income. 
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LABOR RELATIONS 
For the first time in its history the company was, during 1941, beset by labor troubles. 
Early in May the Studio launched a program of reducing operating expenses and personnel, 
designed to bring output in line with results reasonably to be anticipated from the distribution 
of the Company's pictures under present world conditions. As this policy was being initiated, 
a strike was called (on May 28, 1941) by Screen Cartoonists Union, Local No. 852, an affiliate 
of the International Brotherhood of Painters, Paperhangers and Decorators of America (A. F. 
of L.). A majority of our employees stayed at work and during the nine weeks of the strike the 
Company's production proceeded satisfactorily. However, due to secondary boycotts and "hot 
cargo'' activities on the part of sympathetic unions it became impossible to deliver and exhib-
it our product. 
Repeated efforts by the Company to effect a settlement were unavailing. Finally, a com-
missioner from the National Conciliator's Office intervened; arbitration was agreed upon and 
an award was eventually rendered. Among other things, the award imposed the following: a 
close shop; reinstatement of all strikers; and 100 hours' retroactive pay for strikers. In relation 
to our proposed reduction of personnel, the award also imposed a formula under which a cer-
tain percentage of strikers had to be retained pro rata to non-striking employees. However, it 
required the Union to take in as a body without prejudice and at a nominal initiation fee 
employees in its classification who had remained at work during the strike. 
After a period of four weeks of complete shutdown, necessitated by protracted negotia-
tions, the Company resumed operations on September 15, 1941. The Studio is now operating 
under the terms of the award which, unfortunately, is in many respects very ambiguous and is 
silent on several disputed issues. However, the plant is now operating smoothly. 
DIVIDENDS AND SINKING FUND REQUIREMENTS 
In a letter addressed to the stockholders under date of June 14, 1941, you were advised of 
the reason for the omission of the preferred stock sinking fund payment due April 1, 1941, in 
the amount of $50,000 and of the deferment of the quarterly preferred dividend due July 1, 
1941. The necessity for conserving working capital pending the orderly liquidation of the 
Company's inventory of completed feature pictures caused omission of the $100,000 pre-
ferred stock sinking fund payment due October 1, 1941, and deferment of the quarterly divi-
dend on the preferred stock due on that date. Consideration will be given to resumption of 
payments when and as a comfortable working capital position has been re-established, but no 
prediction can be made in this respect at this time. The dividends on the preferred stock being 
cumulative, all arrearages in such dividends as well as fixed sinking fund payments must be 
paid before any dividends may be paid on the common stock. 
GENERAL 
Our principal problem now is one of orderly and satisfactory liquidation of feature prod-
uct. Within the Studio production is going forward and costs are in keeping with present mar-
kets. The Company is operating with less than 50% of the personnel and pay roll of May, 1941. 
Our working capital position is strained because of the large amount of money tied up in fea-
ture negatives--DUMBO, FANTASIA and BAMBI. With proper liquidation of these three fea-
tures, it is believed the Company will reduce its bank loan to a nominal figure or liquidate it 
completely and restore its working capital position to a satisfactory level. DUMBO and BAMBI 
are feature pictures which will have none of the problems of distribution presented by FAN-
TASIA. Both are excellent pictures and should do satisfactory business. 
For the current year, the Company is continuing its production of short subjects and has 
three feature subjects available for production, of which one would ordinarily be completed 
during the 1942 fiscal year. However, your management is making its facilities and equipment 
available for Army, Navy and other Government films in connection with national defense. We 
are now working on short subjects in cooperation with our Government's plans to promote 
hemispheric solidarity and are also producing a series of short subjects for the U. S. Navy and 
five short subjects for the Canadian Government. New feature product is being curtailed in 
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favor of federal defense work. The volume of defense film work required of us will determine 
the extent of work done on feature subjects during the current year. 
In summary, we are still in an adjustment period brought about by world conditions and 
the consequent loss of markets, but we believe we have sustained the major shocks of this 
adjustment. Pictures being projected will be properly budgeted and produced for present 
restricted markets. Our experience with DUMBO and our short subjects gives us every confi-
dence in our ability to meet these conditions satisfactorily with respect both to cost and qual-
ity of our product. 
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Walter E. Disney, President 
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